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Deliberation and debate is the way you stir the soul of our democracy.  




The effect of the Congress on western water reform is often understated, leaving the impression 
that power hungry bureaucrats are responsible for the redundancy that dogs western water 
policies. The Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission wrestled with the appropriate 
role of federal agencies on western rivers, and noted the effect that the division of jurisdiction 
among Congressional committees has on agency structure and mission.   Now that the century 
mark is approaching for the Reclamation Act of 1902, it is particularly appropriate for us to 
revisit how the federal government functions in western rivers and the effect of Congressional 
politics on that issue. 
 
In rivers across the West policy makers confront the questions of how to balance local interests 
with national interests, how river management purposes can be broadened to include 
environmental protection, how citizens can participate in decision-making, and how discordant 
federal policies can be reconciled. The past two decades have witnessed innovation in problem 
solving that has sidestepped the creation of formal institutions, through the creation of consensus 
processes, where participation by multiple agencies and stakeholders has resulted in regional 
solutions. At a national level, water policy reform has not even been particularly salient; funding 
for the Bay-Delta and the Everglades, for example, has proceeded in the absence of statutory 
overhaul.  Consistent with avoiding formal reform, the Interior Department and the Bureau of 
Reclamation were changed from within during Secretary Babbitt’s tenure, so that regional and 
project specific solutions were advanced despite a hostile Congress. 
 
While the attention of the Commission, of academics, and of the Clinton White House focused 
on the Interior Department, the Corps of Engineers quietly stayed above the fray, revealing only 
in the last year of President Clinton’s administration how tenuous Executive branch control of 
the Corps is. A new Administration has proposed to tame the Corps budget, but little else is 
known about its intentions.  In this talk I argue that the direct Congressional relationship to the 
Corps challenges the viability of many reform initiatives at the regional and local level. As we 
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consider the successes and failures of institutional reforms, we must consider how the Corps, and 




The topic of governance continues to exert a pull on the water policy community, because of the 
realization that the physical dimension of improving water management is far less daunting than 
the questions presented by how society organizes itself to address our water challenges.  See for 
example, David H. Getches, Changing the River's Course: Western Water Policy Reform, 26 
Envtl. L. 157 ( Spring 1996)      
 
We can identify many basins where water problems are being addressed in a constructive 
fashion, where gridlock has been broken, parties are talking, water management is improving, 
restoration is occurring and, although no one is ready to say that a problem is solved, the 
direction is far more constructive than it might have been in the absence of these initiatives.  
 
The Rio Grande provides examples of these initiatives.  I spoke at this conference several years 
ago about the dire challenges presented by the Rio Grande. See, Restoring the Rio Grande: A 
Case Study in Environmental Federalism, 28 Environmental Law 15 (1998).  This river stretches 
across three states and two countries and is beset by a growing population, declining species, 
cycles of drought, the depletion of groundwater reserves available for municipal uses, and the 
typical array of federal, state, tribal, municipal, and national governments with a role in 
management.  I focused on the Middle Rio Grande and summarized the failures in the formation 
of basin or watershed management entities. It is now five years later, and a host of new 
organizations has arisen, parallel to those on many other western rivers.   
 
For example, a lawsuit to protect the Rio Grande silvery minnow has resulted in the creation of 
groups which are pursuing means of maintaining the species, attempting to mediate a result in 
the lawsuit, and pursuing initiatives aimed at riparian restoration of stretches of the river. There 
is a lively alliance of environmental groups, and a Pueblo led restoration effort for Pueblo lands.  
Watershed initiatives have taken firm hold in one of the more retrograde basins in the country.  
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I would not describe the initiatives on the Rio Grande nor in most other river basins as resulting 
in basin management, that elusive goal of water policy wonks. Academics and commissions have 
called for management of rivers along hydrological rather than political boundaries for over one 
hundred years, as Doug Kenney has thoroughly researched. Douglas S. Kenney, Source 
Management at the Watershed Level:  An Assessment of the Changing Federal Role in the 
Emerging Era of Community-Based Watershed Management (1997) Experimentation with these 
mechanisms has not resulted in consensus that any one way of organizing governance is better 
than another; rather, cycles of experimentation continue. We have not redrawn state lines every 
generation and the continued attention to governance in water indicates a widespread belief that 
we haven’t gotten it right yet. 
 
What we have witnessed in this generation of experimentation is the initiation of ad hoc groups 
that have forced established institutions to incorporate the goals of better governance, which 
include balancing environmental concerns, better coordination among agencies, better public 
participation, recognizing tribal concerns, and integrating water quality. Each of these goals is 
addressed to some degree in these experiments. 
 
First, environmental concerns were not part of the western prior appropriation scheme. But, 
federal environmental laws empowered environmentalists to alter the operations of western 
rivers, with the power of the courts behind them. Litigation over the protection of the Rio Grande 
silvery minnow is requiring the major water users to consider how protection of a species can be 
accommodated within existing rights and obligations. 
 
Second, without changing statutory schemes, water users and managers have joined in the 
coordination of water resource management in appropriate geographical areas. One concrete sign 
of coordination on the Rio Grande is the creation of an ambitious hydrologic model that will 
provide information to all stakeholders about the region’s water resources and how storage 
facilities are operated. 
 
Third, new stakeholders have been allowed to participate in decision-making, and new 
opportunities for participation in water decision making abound. NEPA requires planning 
processes for federal projects, and federal and state entities operate far more openly than they did 
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a decade ago.  It is easy to deride the sincerity of some of these processes, but reread Cadillac 
Desert to remind yourself of how closed decision-making was a short time ago.  
 
Tribal governments are recognized and acknowledged in water decision making in a way that 
also was unforeseeable a generation ago. The pueblos that border the Rio Grande have made 
their interests in the river abundantly clear, through water quality standard setting, accelerated 
groundwater development, participation in restoration, and attention to the ESA proceedings 
described above.  
 
Finally, another goal that better governance proponents have asserted is the need to bring 
together water quality and water quantity management. The agencies that have these missions are 
not necessarily integrated, but informal mechanisms, such as coordination among agencies, is 
beginning to remedy this. At a federal level, the Clean Water Action Plan requires federal 
agencies to coordinate with other watershed entities in addressing watershed health. (This 
initiative is an administrative, not legislative mandate, and may not be continued.)  
 
These developments are positive and have been well heralded in the literature. The WWPRAC 
endorsed a new relationship between federal agencies and the citizens of the regions who are 
affected by them, calling for basin management, with federal agencies required to participate in 
basin initiatives and to allow greater involvement by local entities. 
 
Despite the progress represented by these initiatives, they are more fragile than we might like to 
acknowledge. Often they have resulted from ESA mandates. In most cases, participation in them 
is not required by the statutory mandates of either federal or state agencies.  Because the ESA 
was the motivating force for many of these programs, any attacks on the ESA, or attempted 
exceptions to its scope, could weaken the motivation to continue to support them. Regrettably, 
the progress on the Rio Grande would almost certainly evaporate overnight were the ESA not 





The challenge of reforming governance: the Corps and the Congress 
 
While greater participation in river governance has been the recent trend in the West, I would 
like to discuss why is it so difficult to get change in formal governance structures for water, and 
to look at the Corps of Engineers in particular for an answer to this question.   
 
The WWPRAC focused on federal agencies in the West, in response to its Congressional charge.  
Senator Hatfield established the Commission so that it would work on the presumed duplication 
and inefficiency of federal agencies. In my work on the Commission, I observed that there is a 
great belief that agencies are redundant, but there is little serious political or academic attention 
devoted to the effect that agency structure has on federal agencies and the affected public. 
 
In particular, the relationship between the Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation begs the 
question of agency redundancy, as it has since at least the 1930s.  The Corps and BOR engineers 
scoured the West, competing over the best dam sites and taking their bitter battles into 
Washington’s labyrinth of power. Obviously, the Corps operates across the nation, while the 
BOR is limited to the seventeen western states.  The Corps now spends more in the West than 
does the Bureau, although this includes expenditures in western coastal states. Table I. 
Nonetheless, within the West there is an arbitrary character to whether a particular river is 
identified as a Corps basin or a BOR basin.  The Commission, based on the unanimous advice 
given us that fundamental reorganization of water agencies was a “nonstarter” in the Congress, 
did not tackle this issue, except through the inclusion of an excellent appendix prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service. (Water in the West, Appendix C) 
 
On the other hand, the debate over the appropriate role of federal agencies in western states often 
was visited by the Commission. This debate sometimes sounds like a fixed and familiar 
argument, with Westerners united in demanding state control over all water resources.  When it 
comes to federal environmental controls, the federal funds provided for a program rarely equal 
the perceived burden on state interests. There, the federalism debate reaches a fevered pitch, and 
is likely to be touched upon many times during this Congress. But, as historians remind us, the 
dependence of western states on federal funding makes the demand that the federal government 
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withdraw from the West a bit more tempered than it appears to be. There is no movement calling 
for an end to Corps’ programs in the West, despite the obvious questions as to why a federal 
agency is responsible for protecting communities from flooding, for operation of dams, and for 
channel maintenance.  
 
A perfect opportunity to think about federalism was this spring when the Bush administration 
criticized Davenport, Iowa for its refusal to build levees along the Mississippi River. Citizens of 
the town protested that they did not want to wall the river off from the town and that they had 
taken appropriate measures to create a floodplain. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
threatened the town with the loss of emergency funds if it continues in this refusal. As far as 
news reports noted, no cost benefit analysis was done comparing the cost to federal taxpayers of 
floodwalls with the cost of emergency assistance that might be required in a particularly large 
flood.  
 
In the federalism debate, the Corps of Engineers largely has escaped the scrutiny cast on the 
Interior Department’s wildlife protection agencies and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
There is also no strong movement for reform of the Corps, nor for reconsideration of how the 
Corps relates to other entities in a watershed.  
 
The politics of the Corps, the reason that it has thrived while other agencies have shrunk and 
suffered constant attack, has been described by several authors. Arthur Maas wrote the definitive 
study in Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers (1951). More recently, 
Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel C. McCool, in Staking Out the Terrain: Power and 
Performance Among Natural Resource Agencies (2d Ed. 1996) further this description.  
  
The Corps is described by Clarke and McCool as a “bureaucratic superstar.” Their analysis of 
why agencies succeed identifies seven factors under the general division into (1) expertise and 
control of information and (2) political and constituency support. The factors might be tailor 
made for the Corps, awarding positive effect to factors that include “prodevelopment; multiple 
use; utilitarian” mission, “scientific, legal, military bases of expertise,” “scientific, legal, or 
military leadership,” a “coherent public image,” a “large; evenly distributed” constituency, 
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“linkages to majoritarian interests” such as “concrete, economic interests,” a “service orientation 
and functions” and “congressional support.” (Id at pg. 7)  
 
 
What would reform of the Corps entail? A coalition of environmental groups recently released a 
report calling for Corps reform. Jeff Stein et al., Taxpayers for Common Sense & National 
Wildlife Federation, Troubled Waters: Congress, The Corps of Engineers, and Wasteful Water 
Projects (2000).  Members of Congress have introduced legislation addressed at Corps reform in 
both the House and Senate.   
 
But a more fundamental cure may be required for this agency, along with others on the western 
landscape. The use of federal tax dollars to pay for these purposes has a powerful effect on what 
is or is not built on western rivers. The most well publicized scandal involving the Corps in 
recent years was the subject of several Washington Post articles and reports by the  Inspector 
General,  Office of Independent Counsel and National Research Council. See, Washington Post, 
December 7, 2000, pg A01;  U. S. Office of Special Counsel, December 6, 2000. The most 
telling moment in this scandal came when the White House suddenly realized how remote the 
Corps was from its direct control, and undertook measures to restore accountability within the 
Corps. Rather than applauding these tardy measures, senior Republicans rallied to “protect” the 
agency from Presidential control with an extraordinary amendment to protect the Corps from 
reorganization.  Attachment 3, Washington Post, May 13, 2000, A-02. The blunt message is that 
the Corps is different from other executive agencies, where the President is accountable for 
implementation of legislation, and for the successes or failures of management.  
 
I would be hard pressed to prove that the purposes for which the Corps spends money in western 
rivers are outside the powers granted the federal government.  But the practical effect of 
subsidies in western water is well understood, from subsidies to agricultural water users to 
subsidies to power users to subsidies to residential users.  If states and municipalities were forced 
to pay the full cost of water, or of the structures built by the Corps, often different solutions 
would be sought. When nonstructural solutions make better fiscal sense, such as the retiring of 
development in flood plains rather than the use of levees, they would be used.  After a century or 
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so of experimentation we can judge whether using federal funds to address these needs results in 
an irremediable distortion of public policy choices.  
 
As with all water stories, the Corps presents paradoxes that make it difficult to generalize 
about it. Concerns about the Corps mission have been met with policy reform and readjustment 
over many years. WRDA 1986 incorporated important insights about the importance of 
balancing environmental protection with other goals and about the benefits to be gained by local 
cost share. The Corps has since procured legislative authorization for river restoration and has 
led the federal effort to restore the Everglades. The talent contained within the Corps and its 
genuine commitment to service deserve acknowledgement and must be incorporated in thinking 
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GOP Senators Seek to Block Corps of Engineers Reforms 
Michael Grunwald 
Washington Post Staff Writer 
 
 Republican senators are pushing to send a blunt legislative message to the executive 
branch: Thou shalt not touch the Army Corps of Engineers. 
 
 An obscure rider tacked on to a farm budget bill last week would build a congressional 
wall of protection around the Corps, blocking all future efforts to reform management 
practices that have been under attack by environmentalists, taxpayer advocates and senior 
Clinton administration officials. 
 
 On the heels of a short-lived administration attempt at reform, the amendment would 
ensure that the Corps remains exactly the way it is. 
 
 The language reads: "None of the funds made available in this or any other Act may be 
used to restructure, reorganize, abolish, transfer, consolidate or otherwise alter or modify 
the organizational or management oversight structure; existing delegations; or functions 
or activities applicable to the Army Corps of Engineers." 
 
 The senators behind the rider, which was passed by the Senate Appropriations 
Committee on Tuesday, are the committee's chairman, Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), and Pete 
V. Domenici (R-N.M.), chairman of the energy and water subcommittee. Aides to 
Domenici--who steered $14 million worth of Corps projects to New Mexico last year, 
including a major flood control initiative for Las Cruces--said he and Stevens are 
unhappy with Army Secretary Louis Caldera's recent "management reforms" designed to 
bring the Corps under civilian control. 
 
 "They want the Army Corps to stay the way it is," Domenici spokesman Chris Gallegos 
said of the senators. "They want it to be accountable to Congress. They don't want it to 
shift so much to the administration." 
 
 The Corps is an executive branch agency based in the Pentagon and run by military 
officers who nominally report to civilian officials. In recent months, it has faced charges 
that top generals manipulated data on a major study of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers 
and planned a "Project Growth Initiative" to expand the Corps' budget without the 
knowledge of civilian administrators. 
 
 When Caldera announced his reforms March 30, saying they were intended to reaffirm 
civilian control, Stevens and two other GOP committee chairmen wrote a letter urging 
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen to suspend them. The Corps has always enjoyed a 
close relationship with Congress, which regularly initiates and funds dozens of Corps-run 
water projects in members' districts. 
 
 The reforms were withdrawn just a week after Caldera announced them, even though 
Cohen had "strongly endorsed" them. At the time, Stevens, Armed Services Committee 
Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.) and Environment and Public Works Committee 
Chairman Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.) suggested that they wanted more time to review the 
reforms, and Caldera said he expected to work with them on his proposals, though they 
had made their skepticism clear. 
 
 Yesterday, the Army called the new proposal "unwarranted and unproductive" in a 
statement. "We are deeply concerned about the effect this provision would have on the 
authority and responsibility of the executive branch . . . to manage the Corps," the 
statement said. 
 
 The rider is expected to come before the full Senate on Tuesday. To become law it also 
would have to pass the House and avoid a veto by Clinton, who in the past has vetoed 
appropriations bills because of amendments he opposed. 
 
 Aides to the senators say they are concerned that the administration is trying to 
"politicize" the Corps. In the last year, for example, civilian officials have intervened in 
studies of dam removal options on the Snake River and water management changes on 
the Missouri River, and in a $7.8 billion restoration plan for the Florida Everglades. In all 
three cases, the administration altered the Corps' recommendations to reflect 
environmental concerns. 
 
 The Corps' critics say that is what civilian officials are supposed to do. And they say the 
Domenici-Stevens rider would block more than Caldera's civilian control effort: It would 
block any attempt to "alter or modify" any Corps "function or activity." 
 
 "It's an incredibly sweeping proposal," a White House official said. "It would block any 
meaningful reforms, and pave the way for projects that gouge taxpayers and the 
environment." 
 
 "The senators feel like the Corps is their pot of pork to play with, and they don't want 
anyone in their way," said Courtney Cuff, a lobbyist for the environmental group Friends 
of the Earth. "This is their way of killing reform and keeping the gravy train running." 
 
 In fact, taxpayer activists and environmentalists say there is a perfect example of a pork 
barrel project buried in the same agriculture appropriations bill that contains the Corps 
rider: The Oregon Inlet Jetties, a controversial $96 million project designed to stabilize a 
boating channel on North Carolina's Outer Banks. The Interior Department believes the 
jetties would accelerate erosion on Pea Island National Wildlife Refuge and Cape 
Hatteras National Seashore, and it has refused to issue the land-use permits the Corps 
needs to proceed with the project. 
 
 Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), the project's chief proponent, inserted an amendment that 
would simply transfer the refuge and seashore land in question from Interior to the Corps, 
so no permits would be necessary. 
 
 A recent report by Taxpayers for Common Sense and the National Wildlife Federation 
ranked the jetties the fifth-worst Corps project in the nation. But a Helms aide said the 
area's commercial fishermen have waited far too long for the project, which Congress 
approved in 1970. "Senator Helms wants this to happen, and the Corps is ready to go 
forward," the aide said. 
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